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ABSTRACT
Businesses take deliberate action to change their internal context when managers believe that
better performance lies beyond the capabilities of assets in their present configuration. A typical
course of action is reorganization. A key consideration for organizational design is how the
relationship between an organization's structure, the structure of its products, and the structure of
its processes influence the value delivered to customers. In some sense, products, processes, and
the organization should "fit" each other. This thesis presents a framework for thinking about
product architecture, enterprise architecture, and the value stream of processes that binds them
together. Critical to any enterprise architecture are process owners that control and improve
organizational processes and product owners that manage the end-to-end development of
products. When a product is significantly complex, independent tiers of product ownership
might be established to ensure that different levels of products - systems, subsystems, or
components - are managed with appropriate developmental objectives in mind. For example,
some components must be distinct to a single product; other components can be common among
several products. The proposed framework shows how product and enterprise architectures can
be integrated to support the development of complex systems.
The thesis also presents a case study to which the proposed framework is applied. The study
focuses on a business that has recently restructured its organization to achieve better alignment
with the complex products it develops. Using the proposed framework, the new organizational
structure is evaluated to determine if the new enterprise architecture positions the business to
increase customer value and accomplish its long-term goals.
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Perfection is like infinity. Trying to envision it (and to get there) is
actually impossible, but the effort to do so provides inspiration and
direction essential to making progress along the path.
Womack and Jones
in Lean Thinking
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1. Introduction
The architectures of the product, its construction process, and the
organization that manages them should "fit" each other.
(Rechtin 2000, 159)
In plain and concise language, this statement - one of Rechtin's heuristics' - captures a key
insight for professionals faced with the issues this thesis intends to address. For the author, it has
provided a conceptual hypothesis and thematic reminder during the consolidation of his research
into a coherent written work. For the reader, this heuristic represents a "bottom line" of sorts,
offered here at the outset of this thesis.
In dissecting this heuristic, the fundamental things of interest are product, process, and
people.2 Each of these things has an architecture, which refers to the thing's underlying
structure. The structures of products, processes, and organizations are inherently interrelated and
intertwined. One cannot begin to consider their architectures in isolation from each other. For
example, products that comprise hardware and software elements arise from processes defined
for hardware and software development, which are executed by groups of people responsible for
hardware and software. Rechtin's heuristic presumes these interconnections and further
prescribes that the architectures "fit" each other. By definition, this "fit" should, in some sense,
be "good" or appropriate. An indicator or indirect measure of "fit"-ness is, generally speaking,
the value provided to the stakeholders associated with the endeavor at hand. Of course, some
minimum threshold of "fit"-ness must be present before any value can be delivered to these
stakeholders. That is, an organization carries out processes and affects products only when
possessing the capability to do so. As used here, capability implies a certain "fit" between the
structures of products, processes, and people, and this capability, when exercised, yields value
for stakeholders.
1 In numerous publications, Rechtin champions the heuristic methodology for architecting systems. To use his
definition, heuristics are "empirical rules of thumb derived from experience and judgment, useful for attacking
problems too complex to be solved by analytical techniques alone" (Rechtin 1992, 66). The late Dr. Eberhardt
Rechtin, among other notable government and industry roles, served as president of The Aerospace Corporation and
later founded the graduate program in systems architecting at the University of Southern California.
2 People is substituted here for organization to yield the three P's often considered the building blocks of business.
Yet the term architecture is more commonly associated with an organization, which denotes a group of people
brought together for a particular purpose.
Quite simply, this thesis investigates the notion of architectural "fit" and its correlation with
delivered value. In other words, how do the relationships between (1) an organization's
structure, (2) the structure of the products it delivers, and (3) the structure of the processes it
executes to yield these products influence the value delivered to its customers and other
stakeholders? Within this overarching research question, the key words - relationships,
influence, and value - are difficult to treat in a quantitative manner. A host of related questions
follows. How does an organization measure its "fit" with its products and processes? To what
extent should the organizational structure mirror the functional or physical decomposition of its
products or the ordered set of processes that transforms its products from concept to design to
finished item? More generally, what organizational structure yields a threshold capability or an
optimized capability, and how might these be expressed as quantified levels of capability? In
turn, how does the level of capability relate to, by way of causation or correlation, the value
provided to each stakeholder? And finally, how is value defined and measured relative to each
stakeholder - to include customers/users, suppliers, partners, and shareholders?
This thesis does not make a rigorous attempt to address these questions using statistical
analysis or other mathematical methods. In accordance with Rechtin's approach to architecting,
this research has more often been governed by the heuristic methodology. That is, empirical
rules of thumb, lessons learned, and subjective insights, rather than formal problem-solving
methods and algorithms, have guided the questions posed, data and information collected and
analyzed, and conclusions drawn. Likewise, the research outcome is not a generalized solution
or codified procedure for determining optimality. Rather, results emerge in the form of new or
expanded heuristics that build upon or refine the existing ones, adapting for the scope and
context of the problem at hand. In many cases, such insights are extremely useful to executives,
managers, and analysts alike when resource limitations preclude detailed decision analysis.
Some readers may question the validity of results not directly supported by quantitative analysis
or dismiss the utility of qualitative decision criteria. To those readers, the author defers to
another of Rechtin's heuristics: An insight is worth a thousand analyses (Rechtin 2000, 96).3
3 Nonetheless, the author agrees with these words attributed to Lord Kelvin: "... when you can measure what you
are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of
knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science..."
1.1. Thesis Structure
This document consists of four major sections, including this introductory part. In addition,
an appendix contains supplemental information. The first section, Introduction, explains the
motivation for this thesis and the approach used to conduct research. It also provides an
introduction to the principal case study for this work. The second section, Frameworks for
Complex System Management, develops the relationships between products, processes, and
organizations and proposes a framework for thinking about architectural 'fit.' The third section,
Case Study for Complex System Management, applies this framework to the principal case study,
which served as the guiding influence for this research effort. The fourth and final section,
Conclusion, summarizes and reiterates the key insights gained from this research effort and
suggests future areas of study. Appendix A provides a description of the diagram methodology
used in many of the figures.
1.2. Motivation
While questions regarding architectural "fit" are, to some degree, relevant for organizations of
all types, they are arguably of most concern to for-profit businesses.4 Already, the opening
discussion has been biased towards commercial organizations in referring to products and
customers. Adapted from Saloner, Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual model for business
performance, from the perspective of business strategists. Relating this model to the opening
discussion, value is clearly captured in "Performance", whether the measure is revenue
(corresponding to customer value) or earnings (corresponding to shareholder value). The three
architectures exist within the "Context" of the business. In particular, people and process
architectures are captured in "Owned/Employed Assets" and "Structure of Owned/Employed
Assets", which contribute to the "Internal" context; and product architectures are accounted for
in "Market Setting" and "Non-Market Setting", which contribute to the "External" context, in the
sense that products are in response to (driven by) the external environment.
4 Rechtin suggests characterizing organizations by their fundamental purposes - bureaucratic (to follow established
rules), profit-seeking (to increase the bottom line), and cultural (to create a compatible team) (Rechtin 2000, 107).
The author suggests adding a fourth to this list: cause-driven (to promote thought and action for an issue).
Accordingly, for-profit businesses have an inherent incentive to take actions that increase value delivered to their
stakeholders, especially customers of their products.
I EXTERNAL CHANGES
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ACTIONS
* Acquire Assets
* Position/Arrange Assets
* Use Assets
* Divest Assets
Figure 1: Conceptual model for business performance (adapted, Saloner 2001, 20)
The model in Figure 1 depicts "codetermination of performance" (Saloner 2001, 3) by the
business's actions and the context in which they are taken. In addition, the effect of certain
actions, whether deliberate or not, may be to alter the context of the business. Questions about
architectural "fit" are associated with this two-stage influence on business performance (i.e.
actions changing context codetermining performance). The general question for the strategist
might be stated as: What (strategic) actions, if any, should the business take now to alter the
context in which (tactical) actions are taken later, such that performance will improve? In turn,
the specific question for the architect might be expressed as: What actions, if any, should be
taken to change how employees (people assets) are grouped and linked with respect to operations
(process assets), and vice versa, such that products respond to the external environment?
In general, businesses take deliberate action to change their internal context when managers
believe that better performance lies beyond the capabilities of existing assets in their present
configuration. At a high level, "better performance" could be tagged as revenue growth, cost
reduction, or both. Under certain circumstances, the course of action could involve
reorganization - the thorough alteration of the structure of a business (American Heritage
Dictionary 2004). While this term is more often identified with the restructuring of people (most
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outwardly in redrawing organizational charts and renaming business units and subunits), the
underlying impetus for change is always the need to redefine, regroup, redistribute, or otherwise
reconfigure processes. That is, adjustments to "what" the business does, in terms of process
execution, are determined before adjusting "how" the business does it, in terms of resource
allocation - human, physical, and so on.
The present research has been motivated and steered by the example of a business that
currently finds itself in this precise situation. In particular, the executive managers have set
strategic goals for revenue growth and are implementing a reorganization to position the business
to achieve these goals. For the author's purposes, the distinct relevance of this case is how
explicitly the change in organizational structure is being shaped by the structure of their products
and processes. Moreover, the external context of this business - to include the nature of its
products, interactions with customers and suppliers, and other industry attributes - provides an
especially rich setting in which to explore the architecting questions raised here. As the central
case study for this research, this example is described and analyzed in detail throughout the body
of this work. The subsection that follows provides an introduction to the business and its current
situation.
1.3. Case Study Introduction
The "business" alluded to previously is Northrop Grumman Space Technology (NGST). As
of the publishing of this thesis, NGST operates as one of seven business sectors within Northrop
Grumman Corporation (NGC) - "a $32 billion global defense and technology company whose
120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in information and
services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers
worldwide" (Northrop Grumman Corporation 2008). For the purposes of this case study, NGST
is considered apart from NGC as a whole, such that terms like organization and enterprise refer
to the business sector on its own. 5
5 The case study is limited to a single NGC business sector. As will be described in the next subsection, the author's
research was conducted solely at NGST and the situation of interest was largely self-contained within this business
sector. This does not imply that the concepts addressed in this thesis are not equally applicable or relevant at the
corporation level.
1.3.1. Description of Organization
A general description of NGST is provided here in the form of a business strategy, using the
construct proposed in Saloner.6 While this portrayal of NGST is supported by company-released
information and interviews with employees, it is ultimately the author's interpretation and does
not necessarily represent the expressed views of NGST. This description is intended to present a
brief profile of the organization rather than a comprehensive analysis.
Goals. In general, NGST strives to be the technology leader for all market/product segments in
which it competes. By many accounts, NGST has long sustained a reputation among customers
and competitors as the "go-to" business for state-of-the-art technology and the most challenging
product development efforts. A closely related goal is to deliver the highest quality products in
terms of performance and reliability. To some extent, these priorities challenge NGST's ability
to compete as the lowest cost provider, yet customers are often willing to accept a price premium
for the sake of reliable products that meet demanding performance requirements. As a long-term
goal, market dominance - having the largest market share of revenue - is less significant to
NGST in a consolidated industry of only a half dozen competitors. Still, NGST has recently
identified revenue growth as an important goal, given projected market opportunities in the next
few decades.
Scope. NGST is primarily a provider of space systems and related technologies to the United
States government. Its major market segments (by customer) are civil and military organizations
with mission areas that require space-based assets. Its major product segments (by purpose) are
communications satellites, earth observation/remote sensing satellites for environmental
purposes, earth observation/remote sensing satellites for surveillance purposes, and space
telescope observatories. NGST maintains the in-house capability for end-to-end product
development, to include the design, manufacture, integration, and test of entire satellite systems
(i.e. spacecraft bus and payload). In addition, NGST invests heavily in technology development
for the majority of satellite subsystems and components.
6 Saloner suggests that a coherent business strategy should have four elements: (1) long-term goals that describe
"where" the business is going, (2) scope that defines in "what" activities the business engages, (3) competitive
advantage that defines "how" the business achieves its goal within its scope, and (4) logic that explains "why" the
intended competitive advantage is sustainable (Saloner 2001, 19-23).
Competitive Advantage. A principal source of competitive advantage for NGST is its system
engineering capability. In particular, expertise in the system engineering discipline enables
technology infusion in a manner that enhances operational performance without compromising
reliability. Advancing the state-of-the-art while mitigating the inherent risks of new technology
is a significant capability, especially within the context of satellite development. In many
respects, this distinguishes NGST from competitors and attracts the most technically complex
development projects from customers. NGST also enjoys a competitive advantage via its
industry position as one of only a few domestic system integrators - having the facilities and
infrastructure to integrate, test, and deliver complete satellites. This draws implicit support and
protection from the United States government. In addition, NGST's position is reinforced by a
longstanding relationship with the civil and military customers that have propelled the satellite
industry over the past fifty years. Some suggest that NGST has further endeared itself to
customers by cooperating more as a partner than a contractor during development efforts.
Logic. Overall, NGST has achieved and sustains a position as the satellite industry's technology
leader because it effectively leverages its technology investment during the development phase
of each and every operational system. In part, success depends on keeping development work
for the majority of key components in-house. Without internal control of design and
manufacturing processes, technology insertion might occur more slowly or with less reliability.
Moreover, the system engineering effort might grow increasingly difficult when required to
coordinate across a larger set of subcontractors and suppliers. The logic of the strategy
summarizes as follows. To effectively capitalize on technology investment, NGST maintains
end-to-end product development capabilities, which have built and internalized system
engineering expertise at the spacecraft bus and payload levels, which has established NGST as a
system integrator reputed for fielding reliable state-of-the-art technology.
1.3.2. Description of Current Situation
As noted above, NGST has established revenue growth as a primary goal during the coming
years. The executive management team believes that bringing in new business (i.e. government
contract awards in existing and previously untapped market segments) hinges upon two key
ingredients: (1) addressing customer needs and (2) delivering competitive products. Many
managers at NGST refer to these drivers as customer focus and product focus, respectively, to
imply that each is a mindset for the organization to embrace. Having identified these revenue
drivers, the executive management team assessed that NGST's current organization was not
configured to efficiently pursue future growth. Consequently, the team devised and initiated a
realignment of the organizational structure.7 The realignment brings about two significant
adjustments, which position NGST for ensuring customer focus and product focus, respectively:
(1) splitting the business development and program management functions into separate
customer divisions, each responsible for a different market segment and (2) merging the design
and production functions into a single product development division. The details of these
changes, and others not specified here, are presented in a later section. An immediate objective
of the realignment is to clarify the roles and responsibilities of these newly formed divisions.
An important consideration surrounding the decision for NGST's latest reorganization was
progress made since the previous reorganization. Specifically, the prior organizational structure
consisted of functional groups with explicit ownership of processes, grouped into core process
areas (e.g. engineering, production and supply chain) and enabling process areas (e.g. human
resources, information technology). Under this structure, NGST embodied a process focus,
emphasizing that all processes be clearly defined, documented, measured, and managed for
compliance and improvement. A formal Six Sigma program emerged as a focal point for process
improvement and process control initiatives. Moving forward with the current realignment, the
executive management team stresses two points to the organization: (1) NGST's process
orientation in prior years has provided a foundation on which the organization can progress and
(2) their process-mindedness should not be diminished as other business concerns receive greater
emphasis.
While the new organizational structure at NGST has been implemented (i.e. organizational
charts redrawn, divisions renamed, and senior management reshuffled), the underlying changes
in mindset and behavior believed to enable revenue growth are obviously not instantaneous.
Recall that reorganization is a means of altering the internal context of a business through
repositioning of assets. Yet a new organizational structure in itself does not determine better or
worse performance. NGST is now faced with leveraging its new structure to provide the
7 The executive management team at NGST prefers the term realignment, rather than reorganization, to underscore
the intent of the restructuring - aligning the organization with its customers and products. These two terms are used
interchangeably throughout this thesis.
intended focus on customers and products. At this early stage, structural decisions continue at a
greater level of detail. Each division is investigating how to configure its inherited processes, in
conjunction with selecting whom to assign responsibility for them. In addition, each division is
examining how to establish interfaces with other divisions and external organizations, to include
customers, partners, and suppliers. These are the types of decisions for which architectural "fit"
with products and processes and their expected influence on business performance are
predominant considerations.
1.4. Research Approach
The author's research originated and evolved during a six-month internship conducted at
NGST's Space Park campus in Redondo Beach, California. For the most part, the NGST case
study became the starting point and guiding influence for the entire effort. The present situation
at NGST developed as an unanticipated sequence of events (from the author's point of view)
during the internship period. The announcement and implementation of the realignment, which
were separated by several months, both occurred as part of the author's on-site experience. As
these events unfolded, the author and his NGST supervisors identified issues of particular
relevance to NGST that also showed potential for a greater research context. The workable
issues that emerged centered on the concept of product focus, which became the tag line for the
author's research throughout the internship.
1.4.1. Problem Statement
As noted earlier, the term product focus is used at NGST to denote a general approach to
ensuring the competitiveness of their products in the marketplace. While technical performance
and reliability remain important to NGST's government customers, affordability and speed of
development are increasingly becoming higher priorities for (existing and potential) customers.
Consequently, these considerations are key differentiators from competitors. Delivering
products at lower cost and on a faster schedule requires a broader scope of management than
simply satisfying technical specifications. And so, the complete realization of product focus
entails two features: (1) mechanisms to ensure accountability for products and (2) methods to
manage product evolution with respect to the full scope of customer needs - technical
performance, cost, and schedule.
By all accounts, NGST implements both of these elements to the fullest extent at the satellite
level. That is, program offices at NGST (i.e. groups responsible for executing a particular
government contract) maintain continuous oversight of the performance, cost, and schedule
objectives for their respective contracted end systems. However, oversight mechanisms at levels
below the end system are less rigorous, especially with respect to subsystems and components
that are common (by some comparison of function and performance) across multiple end
systems. In other words, product focus, as defined above, is not fully realized at NGST when
viewed from outside the boundaries of a particular program office.
The general problem facing NGST is an incomplete ability to enhance the competitiveness of
their products. This does not imply that their products are uncompetitive (clearly, NGST's
sustained position in the industry indicates the opposite), but rather that NGST could better
manage the likelihood of delivering competitive products. A primary gap lies in accountability -
the first element of product focus - for products defined at levels below the end system (e.g.
subsystems, components).8 In turn, management of these products' evolution - the second
element of product focus - occurs unsystematically through an often uncoordinated series of
development decisions that serve one program office at a time. The outcome is uncertainty
about the past, current, or future performance, cost, and cycle time of these products, when
viewed irrespectively from the end systems for which they are developed. As will be discussed
in a later section, drawbacks to this outcome include (1) repetition of presumably non-recurring
development tasks, (2) unclear cost and schedule targets for driving process execution, and (3)
inaccurate cost and schedule estimates for developing contract proposals.
An underlying difficulty is ambiguity about what constitutes a product at these lower levels.
That is, considering the breakdown of the end system, are products defined as subsystems,
components, parts, or all of these? Similarly, considering the sequence of development stages,
are products defined as specification documents, build-to drawings, physical hardware (e.g. work
in process or finished items), or all of these? The answers to these seemingly basic questions are
less than obvious for an organization like NGST who undertakes end-to-end development and
full-up integration of complex end systems.
8 As will be discussed in a later section, product is a relative term that shifts identity in the sequence of suppliers and
customers. It might be said that end products are delivered to end or external customers. Accordingly, lower level
products, as described here, might be considered intermediate or internal products from the supplier's viewpoint.
In short, the problem statement summarizes as follows. Organizations often struggle to
implement effective oversight mechanisms for intermediate products in conjunction with
well-established oversight mechanisms for their end products. This problem is especially
evident in the context of contracted end products. Rigorous management of contracted end
products independently benefits each customer, but often dominates similar management of
intermediate products that are common across multiple end products, which has the potential to
simultaneously benefit all customers and improve the competitiveness of all levels of products.
1.4.2. Objectives
The author's research suggests the following hypothesis in response to the above problem
statement. Organizations can effectively implement multiple tiers of product oversight
when their product and process architectures are made explicit in their organizational
structure. Formalized product and process ownership ensures accountability and creates
interfaces at which tiers of product management (e.g. end products versus intermediate
products) balance their influence on product evolution. In support of this hypothesis, the
goal of this thesis is to elaborate the concept of architectural "fit" and its importance with respect
to realization of productfocus. There are several objectives that address the general situation for
organizations and several others that pertain to the NGST case study.
* Establish a general framework for the product life cycle that considers product and process
architectures apart from the organization.
* Establish a general framework for product management that overlays organizational structure
on the product life cycle.
* Apply the presented framework within the developmental context of space systems and the
organizational context of NGST.
* Evaluate the architectural "fit" and realization of product focus at NGST through comparison
of their organizational structure before and after the realignment.
The first two objectives are primarily addressed in the second section of this document. The last
two objectives are covered in the third section of this document.
1.4.3. Sources and Methods
This subsection describes the information sources and collection methods that have supported
this research effort. In general, the author used a balance of (1) published literature from prior
research and (2) information obtained during the internship to develop the conceptual
frameworks and case study analysis presented in this thesis.
Research Literature
In order to develop an understanding of the relevant theory and concepts related to
architectural "fit", the author surveyed several major research topics in the published literature.
Each subject area and the chief works reviewed by the author are described below. In name, the
first three topics appear to isolate the product, process, and people architectures. However, any
reader quickly recognizes that detailed investigation of one necessarily informs the study of the
other two. The fourth and final topic provides information on space systems and the greater
aerospace industry in support of the NGST case study.
System architecture. As used here, this topic focuses on the technical design of products - in
particular, the translation of customer/user needs into value-related functions that are mapped to
physical or informational elements. The literature on system architecture is vast, and major
product categories (e.g. electronics hardware, computer software, automotive systems, and
aerospace systems) have detailed architecting methodologies of their own. For the purposes of
this research, the basic principles of system architecture were sufficient. The collection of
lecture slides and notes from Professor Edward Crawley's System Architecture course at MIT
provides a thorough overview of key definitions and ideas. The course material draws from
several pivotal works in this area, to include Suh (1990) and Rechtin & Maier (2000). It also
introduces the object-process methodology of Dori (2002) that utilizes rigorous diagramming
conventions for system modeling, which will be featured throughout this thesis.
System development. This topic considers the structured set of processes that creates product
solutions in response to customer/user needs. The literature for product design and development
is also extensive. Ulrich & Eppinger (2004) presents a generic product development process for
products that are engineered, discrete, and physical - from simple devices to complex equipment
and instruments. Adamsen (2006) proposes a development framework for complex systems,
which encompasses aerospace systems, ship systems, and ground systems for governments and
businesses that operate large-scale equipment. As an extension to system development, another
body of literature studies platform development and design for commonality. A principal work
is Meyer & Lehnerd (1997). An excellent overview of product platform planning is contained in
Robertson & Ulrich (1998). A related body of literature, arising from the lean methodology set
forth in Womack & Jones (2003), takes a deeper look at system development to understand how
value is defined and created during design and other activities upstream of production. Graduate
research in conjunction with MIT's Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) has produced a set of
master's theses addressing lean product development, including Chase (2001), Millard (2001),
and Slack (1998).
Organizational structure. This topic considers the study of organizational design and how the
grouping and linking of resources into functional groups and product teams influences business
performance. A comprehensive analysis of organizational structures in the automotive industry
is contained in Cusumano (1998), which uses statistical methods to find relationships between
organizational structure and development cost and lead-time. Organizations are increasingly
being studied formally as systems - so-called enterprise systems - that can be architected in a
way similar to products. This approach is introduced in Rechtin (2000). An overview of the
emerging field of enterprise architecting is given in Nightingale & Rhodes (2002). While this
thesis equates the enterprise to a single firm, some literature considers an extended enterprise
comprised of a central firm and its customers, suppliers, labor, and capital. For example,
Piepenbrock (2008) expands enterprise architecting beyond a firm's internal organizational
structure to include the structure of a firm's supplier, labor, and investor relations.
Space systems and aerospace industry. This topic considers both technical information about
satellite architecture and design and the industry context in which space systems are developed.
A principal reference for satellite development is Larson & Wertz (1999), which provides a
comprehensive discussion of the end-to-end development process with physics-based design
rules and procedures for all major spacecraft subsystems. Murmann et al. (2002) contains an
insightful discussion of the aerospace industry - historical background and future outlook - that
helps to frame the stakeholder environment which drives the evolution of modern satellites.
NGST Internship
With the internship as the primary determinant of the research setting and timetable, the
author took advantage of his embedded status within the NGST organization. In order to
develop an understanding of the scope and context of the case study, a diversity of information
sources were drawn upon over the course of the internship. Each information source and its
relevance are described in some detail below.
Product documentation. The major sources of product information were: (1) descriptive
documents that capture requirements, specifications, design details (function allocated to
physical elements), and analysis results; and (2) drawing packages that capture physical
dimensions and configurations, part listings (type and quantity), and fabrication and assembly
instructions. These information sources were sufficient to characterize the product architecture
for a given system, subsystem, or component. In most cases, the document and drawing
hierarchies in themselves mirrored the structure of the product. It should be noted that the
majority of product documents were generated for a particular government contract. As a result,
nearly all documentation for intermediate products (e.g. subsystems and components) was
associated with a single contracted end system.
Process documentation. The major sources of process information were: (1) process flow
maps and listings that depict interconnections between processes and hierarchies of processes
and subprocesses; (2) descriptive documents that define and explain individual processes in
terms of their purpose, owners, inputs and outputs, suppliers and customers, sequence of
activities, and metrics; and (3) related procedures, work instructions, and tools (e.g. templates
and checklists) that support process execution. For the most part, these information sources were
sufficient to characterize the intended process architecture. Whether this architecture was
realized in practice might be indicated by scorecards and other periodic compliance assessments,
which were required of all process owners. The process documentation was comprehensive as a
result of NGST's process focus since their previous reorganization in 2001.
Six Sigma project documentation. All documentation in support of completed and ongoing
process improvement projects (e.g. DMAIC/DMADV projects as part of Six Sigma Green Belt
and Black Belt certification) was archived and accessible through a database. For each project,
relevant information included (1) the project charter (i.e. problem statement, business case,
project scope), (2) voice of the customer (VOC) data, (3) related technical and financial data,
(4) analysis results, and (5) project outcomes in the form of new/revised process descriptions,
tools for process execution, and metrics for process control. Several Six Sigma projects of
interest addressed key issues related to managing product evolution. The documentation for
these projects, especially VOC data, provided insights into the technical and organizational
challenges of product management in the context of complex system development. The
outcomes of these projects included new processes intended to improve product management,
some of which had limited success because of the very challenges that were identified from the
outset.
Executive management team communications. In addition to the standard top-down flow of
information, the NGST sector president and team of vice presidents used several channels to
communicate directly with the entire organization, including (1) sector-wide email and web
announcements, (2) panel discussions at sector-wide events, and (3) webcasts of focus group
sessions. The announcements and discussion forums regarding the organizational realignment
were of particular interest because they captured the executive management team's rationale and
expectations for the restructuring in a concise and direct manner, and invoked questions and
concerns about strategy and implementation from individuals working in various parts of the
organization.
Production facility tours. The author had the opportunity to tour a series of production
facilities spread across the Space Park campus, including (1) microelectronics fabrication lines,
(2) mechanical component assembly lines, (3) electrical component assembly (manual and
automated) lines, (4) subsystem-level tests areas, (5) system-level integration facilities, and
(6) system-level test areas. The significance of these tours was to observe first-hand the
technical complexity of space systems and to appreciate the challenge of building and sustaining
in-house end-to-end development expertise. In other words, reading product and process
documentation is by no means a complete substitute for walking assembly lines and handling
product hardware and manufacturing equipment.
Personal interviews. By far the most critical information source was interviews with NGST
employees from various parts of the organization. Throughout the internship, the author had
regular interaction with more than two dozen individuals, primarily Black Belts and Master
Black Belts within the Six Sigma program. One-time meetings were conducted, usually on a
one-on-one basis, with roughly a dozen other individuals from functional groups such as system
engineering, design, and production. These interviews offered first-hand accounts and other
anecdotal evidence about how the organization has historically addressed the issues of interest,
including concrete examples of more or less successful approaches and outcomes. In addition,
these individuals shared their personal thoughts and opinions about competing in the satellite
industry and key challenges facing NGST. Given that the majority of individuals were long-time
employees from a range of functional backgrounds, the collective set of interviews provided a
complete perspective of both the industry and organizational context.
2. Frameworks for Complex System Management
This section presents the relevant concepts related to architectural "fit" and integrates them
into a framework for thinking about how to manage product development. While numerous
frameworks of this kind have been formalized in the published literature, this version has an
implicit bias towards the product architecture, in the sense that the organization and its processes
are primarily shaped by the goal of delivering competitive products. The objectives of this
section are as follows.
* Establish a general framework for the product life cycle that considers product and process
architectures apart from the organization.
* Establish a general framework for product management that overlays organizational structure
on the product life cycle.
Throughout this discussion, it is important to establish operational or working definitions for all
key ideas. 9 Consistent meaning and usage of terminology are essential to fostering a common
understanding of these frameworks and their applicability. For this reason, key definitions
appear in boldface type and are set apart from the document text. It is the author's intent to
uphold these definitions throughout the remainder of this thesis. In addition, some words are
reserved, in that they have a specific usage context that should not be confused with more
common ones found in the English language. When introduced for the first time in this context,
these reserved words appear in italic, boldface type and are in line with the document text. Here
again, the author intends to maintain consistent usage of all key terminology. Finally, other key
words and phrases appear in italic type to indicate specific terms whose definitions can be
inferred from the surrounding discussion. Still other words appear in italic type simply as a
matter of emphasis.
9 In the spirit of consistent language, it should be noted that the term operational definition in itself has a rather
precise meaning in the field of philosophy. Most simply, an operational definition of something provides a
measurement process for determining whether or not it exists. Accordingly, not all ideas and concepts may have an
operational definition in the strictest sense. In these cases, the term working definition is used, which provides an
adequate and unambiguous way to identify something.
2.1. General Viewpoints
Broadly speaking, all things can be classified as either an object or a process. It is debatable
whether one category is subordinate to the other, given the tightly coupled nature of the two.
While objects have a static, tangible (or mental) existence that humans can perceive, processes
embody patterns of transformation that are carried out on objects and with objects. Dori suggests
that processes are "carriers to which we mentally assign responsibility" for changing objects,
and they "exist" only to the extent that the changed objects are perceived in their past and present
forms (Dori 2002, 58). Though abstract on its own, this object-process construct gives rise to
two possible viewpoints that are useful in the realm of product development. The system
viewpoint refers to an object-centric view of the world, which emphasizes the physical objects or
humans that carry out processes. The SIPOC viewpoint (which makes use of a Six Sigma tool
that stands for Suppliers-Inputs-Process-Outputs-Customers) refers to a process-centric view of
the world, which emphasizes the transformations that objects undergo.
2.1.1. Systems
To be a clear, a system is an object (as used above) which exists for a particular purpose. The
literature provides numerous, yet similar, definitions for the term "system." In most examples,
emphasis is on the part-whole relationship. Rechtin suggests this two-part definition (Rechtin
1991, 28):
* A system is a complex set of dissimilar elements or parts so connected or related as to
form an organic whole.
* The whole is greater in some sense than the sum of the parts, that is, the system has
properties beyond those of the parts. Indeed, the purpose of building systems is to gain
those properties.
For the author's purposes, the term system is used broadly to mean a collection of physical
and/or human elements. A product system refers primarily to a physical structure that is used by
human operators, whereas an enterprise system refers mainly to a people structure that uses
physical instruments. Therefore, this general definition is adopted:
SYSTEM - a collection of physical objects and/or humans, which are
configured together to produce results beyond those achievable when taken
as separate elements
A key notion to consider is the unbounded nature of systems. That is, "each system is inherently
part of a still larger [super]system" (Rechtin 1991, 1). Similarly, each system is divisible into
still smaller subsystems until some indivisible, atomic element is reached. Figure 2 illustrates
this using an object-process diagram (OPD). 10 The boundary dotted lines are not formally part of
the OPD, but depict how an observer's relative view of a system forms internal interfaces among
its subsystems and external interfaces with its supersystem. The supersystem can be viewed as
part of the external environment for the system.
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Figure 2: System view
A system exhibits a set of functions that accounts for the purpose of its existence, including
the need for its creation and the goal of its behavior. These functions are closely related to the
'0 Appendix A contains a description of the OPD symbology used in figures throughout this thesis, which adheres to
the modeling convention set forth in Dori (2002).
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processes that the system carries out. The system view is considered object-centric because a
system is more easily described by its elements and the connections between them. The
elements of the system are arranged in a particular configuration (the system's structure) with the
intent to exhibit certain dynamics (the system's behavior). The combination of structure and
intended behavior represents the architecture of the system. Figure 3 summarizes the system
construct in an OPD.
Figure 3: Model of a generic system (Dori 2002, 266)
2.1.2. SIPOCs
As noted above, a process embodies the transformation of one or more objects and does not
have a tangible existence of its own. Consequently, processes are effectively inseparable from
the objects that they affect. The SIPOC view is considered process-centric because the intended
pattern of transformation receives greater emphasis than the set of objects that enter and exit the
process. Among the input objects to a process are those that are transformed, as well as those
(human operators or physical instruments) that enable the process. The output objects are those
that result from the process. When an object is transformed - consumed, yielded, or otherwise
affected, it is said to be an operand of the process. The SIPOC associates the input and output
objects with their suppliers and customers. The SIPOC acronym also implies that the process is
under some degree of human control, which is generally assigned to the process owner. In fact, a
SIPOC map is constructed from the process owner's point of view. For input objects, there is a
distinction between objects provided externally by suppliers (and acted upon by the process) and
objects provided internally by the process owner (and carry out the process). Figure 4 illustrates
the SIPOC concept using an object-process diagram (OPD).
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Figure 4: SIPOC view
A key notion to consider is the infinite nature of SIPOC chains. Depending on the observer's
point of view, an individual or group is simultaneously a customer, process owner, and supplier.
That is, the customer from a previous process is the process owner of the current process, and, in
turn, the supplier to the next process. Similarly, the output objects from a previous process
become input objects to the next process. In this way, a virtually endless string of processes is
formed. Figure 5 depicts a SIPOC chain.
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Figure 5: SIPOC chain
The SIPOC chain can grow in two ways: (1) by extension when new process links are appended
to the beginning or end (upstream or downstream) of the existing chain and (2) by expansion
when existing process links are spread into a sequence of two or more enclosed subprocesses.
Admittedly, the discussion thus far has been rather abstract. The following subsections build
upon these basic constructs to formalize the interconnections between products, processes, and
organizations.
2.2. Product Systems
Having already used the term "product" extensively throughout this document, it is long
overdue to provide an operational definition for it. As mentioned, a product is a system and
therefore exhibits all of the properties inherent to a system. For the author's purposes, what
distinguishes a product system from a generic system is that a product is created with the intent
of selling it for profit. Accordingly, a product has a tangible existence (either physical or
informational) and presumably provides value - benefit at cost - to one or more beneficiaries (a
generalization of customers). Therefore, this definition is adopted:
PRODUCT - a physical or informational object that provides value to one or
more beneficiaries, created by a business with the intent of selling it for profit
to these beneficiaries
Figure 6 summarizes the object-system-product hierarchy, which is a fundamental model
developed in Dori (2002).
Figure 6: Object-system-product hierarchy (Dori 2002, 266)
2.2.1. Form and Function
A product system is most often described with respect to its form and function. The literature
for system architecture provides many similar definitions for these ideas. Crawley offers the
following pair of definitions (Crawley 2007):"
* Form encompasses the elements (disaggregated physical and informational pieces) of a
product and the structure (physical or virtual connections) among these elements.
* Function encompasses the processes exhibited by the product with explicit identification
of the operands (input and output objects) that undergo change during these processes.
Several thoughts related to form and function are worthy of mention here. To start, note that
a product's form is readily depicted using the system view as shown in Figure 2. This so-called
decompositional view, which is shown generically in Figure 7, lists the elements of form in a
hierarchy of part-whole relationships. Note that parts are considered the lowest level in the
hierarchy because they are indivisible, atomic elements; whereas material is inherently a
continuum of matter until shaped into a discrete part. While useful on its own, this view does not
capture the connectivity between elements, which occurs at internal and external interfaces
arising from the chosen system boundary. Therefore, the structural view, which is best
represented in an engineering drawing, provides the remaining information about a product's
form, such as spatial configuration and assembly instructions.
The decompositional and structural views become increasingly difficult to represent as the
number of elements grows larger. One aspect of product complexity is the sheer number of
elements and/or number of connections between elements. A first-order measure of complexity,
as suggested by Crawley, is to count the number of elements. Different products might be
stratified into levels of complexity by making use of the 7 ± 2 rule. 12 That is, simple products
consist of one to nine (-(7 + 2)') elements, moderately complex products of nine to 81 (-(7 ±
2)2) elements, and highly complex products of significantly greater than 81 (-(7 + 2) 3) elements.
" Crawley (2007) refers to the collection of lecture slides and notes from his System Architecture course at MIT.
All references to Crawley draw upon this source, however, specific lecture and slide numbers are not cited.
12 This rule refers to a supposed limit, proposed by psychologist George Miller, on the number of information pieces
that an average human can reliably transmit using immediate memory (Miller 1956).
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Figure 7: Decompositional view of a product's form
A product's function does not lend itself to a strict hierarchical view of processes and
subprocesses. Whereas smaller elements of form simply aggregate into larger ones, Crawley
suggests that lower-level functions combine in a "nonlinear" way to make higher-level functions
emerge. Indeed, the notion of "a whole greater than the sum of its parts" relates to the emergent
property of system-level functions. In contrast to the hierarchy in Figure 7, Figure 8 illustrates
the rather unstructured composition of processes, where zooming in (or out) reveals (or hides)
embedded subprocesses that have a "loose" part-whole relationship. It can still be said that
higher-level functions decompose into lower-level ones, but functional decomposition and
physical decomposition create hierarchies of a slightly different nature.
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Figure 8: View of a product's function
2.2.2. Product Architecture
Another key term that remains undefined is "architecture." Previously, the discussion has
implied that architecture is synonymous with structure. This is a rather imprecise definition.
More formally, architecture embodies the relationship between form and function, a mapping
between objects and the processes they enable. For a product system, this definition is adopted:
PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE - the allocation of processes to one or more
elements of a product's form, which, by virtue of the elements' structure,
enables a product's function to emerge
The mapping of function to form is guided by a concept, which provides a specific solution in
response to a need or opportunity. Each concept generates a different product architecture,
which achieves its function through particular behavior exhibited by a particular structure of
elements. In summary, Figure 9 tailors the previously shown model of a generic system for a
product system.
Another aspect of product complexity is the nature of the function to form mapping embodied
in the product architecture. Architectures that contain mostly one-to-one relationships between
objects and processes are said to be modular, and are characterized by relatively straightforward
connections between elements and a predictable combining of lower-level functions. Those that
contain several one-to-many relationships between objects and processes (or vice versa) are said
to be integral, and are characterized by intricate connections and especially emergent higher-
°°
level functions. Accordingly, modularity implies architectural simplicity and integrality implies
architectural complexity, irrespective of the number of elements that compose the product.
Figure 9: Model of a product system
2.3. Process Streams
As previously described, processes are inseparable from the objects they change. For any
given product, one can distinguish between (1) those processes that affect the product as it is
brought into existence and (2) those processes that affect the product as it provides value to its
beneficiaries. Using the SIPOC view, there is aprocess stream that denotes a set of activities
performed in some order over time. Equivalently, there is aproduct life cycle that denotes a set
of states transitioned in some order over time. The process stream and product life cycle do not
refer to the processes enabled by the product (i.e. product viewed as an instrument), but rather
those processes acting on the product (i.e. product viewed as an operand). This distinction is
especially subtle when the product is actually operating - simultaneously an instrument
performing its intended function and an operand in the sense that human operators are changing
it between states of "in use" and "out of use."
The complete end-to-end process stream or product life cycle progresses a product from its
conception into mental existence, to its production into physical existence, to its disposal into
physical (and perhaps mental) oblivion. A distinct point along the process stream is that moment
when the product attains complete physical existence, having the potential to perform its
intended function. This point coincides with when the product changes from output to input,
possession changes from supplier to customer, and most importantly, selling occurs to the
beneficiary. The stretch of the process stream prior to this point consists of developmental
processes, and the stretch following this point consists of operational processes. The set of
developmental processes is closely related to the notion of a value stream. Womack defines the
product value stream as "the set of all the specific actions required to bring a specific product...
through the three critical management tasks of any business" (Womack 2003, 19). He goes on to
identify the three tasks as (1) problem-solving (from concept to design), (2) information
management (from order to delivery), and (3) physical transformation (from raw materials to
finished product). For the author's purposes, the first and third of these are most critical to the
process stream. 13
Figure 10 depicts a generic representation of the process stream. The set of processes form a
flow in the center of the diagram. Note the division (dotted line boxes) of the process stream
between developmental and operational processes. Above the process flow, the product life
cycle is shown as a series of states that the product transitions through. Alternatively, below the
process flow, the product life cycle is shown as a series of input and output objects that equate to
the product's existence at each point along the process stream. Either representation of the
product life cycle is correct, however, the bottom one is more instructive when considering that
the product moves between process owners (e.g. designers, builders) along a SIPOC chain.
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Figure 10: Process stream (product life cycle)
13 While important, order to delivery is a transitional stage between the developmental and operational stretches of
the process stream, which encompasses the selling transaction and transfer of possession from supplier to customer.
Similar to the processes associated with a product's function, the process stream can also be
zoomed in (or out) to reveal (or hide) embedded subprocesses that act on the product. Figure 11
illustrates several examples of this in conjunction with the process stream from Figure 10.
Zooming in or out is equivalent to expanding or contracting the SIPOC chain. For example, as
shown, by zooming in the building process to reveal the fabricating, assembling, and integrating
subprocesses, the SIPOC chain is expanded to reveal several stages of work-in-process (WIP),
which are previously embedded input and output objects.
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Figure 11: Zooming in and out of the process stream
2.3.1. Product Essence
The product life cycle implies that a product "exists" from the moment it is conceived, even if
no tangible object is present. The notion of essence suggests that objects are either physical or
informational. Crawley speaks of a duality between the physical and informational forms, in
that (1) all physical objects can be captured in informational form (e.g. blueprint of Sears Tower)
and (2) all informational objects must be captured in physical form (e.g. data stored on a hard
disk). Throughout its life cycle, a product transitions from a series of informational forms (e.g.
concept, design) to a series of physical forms (e.g. prototype, work-in-process), culminating as a
finished product - its complete physical existence. Each informational form has a corresponding
physical object that "stores" the product (e.g. concept sketch or engineering drawing on paper).
Once the product progresses to a finished product, an associated informational form is possible,
but not necessary (e.g. designs are usually archived in some way). The intermediate stages of a
product (e.g. work-in-process) effectively have a mixed essence in that some proportion exists in
physical form - partially-built objects - and the rest exists in informational form - design
elements yet to be fabricated. Figure 12 depicts the product life cycle with the physical and
informational forms at each stage. A notional "essence bar" is drawn along the product life cycle
to suggest the proportion of the product that is informational versus physical. Early on, the
product is completely informational. After the building process, the product is mostly, if not all,
physical - depending on whether or not information storage media is an element of its form (note
that a software product might be considered completely informational in its end state).
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Figure 12: Process stream with consideration for product essence
During the early stages of the product life cycle, it is important to make the distinction between
the product's mental existence, for example, as a design, and the physical form that stores the
product in this state. An engineering drawing in itself is not the product, recalling that a product
is defined as an object to be sold. In most cases, a drawing is not sold and does not directly
provide value to the beneficiary. A drawing simply stores the actual product at a time when the
product exists in an informational form. Of course, when considering the SIPOC chain, a
drawing is an output object received by a customer, say the builder. From his perspective, a
drawing might appear to be a product of his supplier, say the designer. However, in keeping a
strict definition of product, a drawing is at most a work product that arises as the actual product
is brought into complete physical existence.
2.3.2. Process Value
Another important consideration when discussing the process stream is the value associated
with each process along the flow. A simple though useful definition of value is benefit provided
at cost. Benefit rests in the product's function, in that function satisfies a need or opportunity
identified by the beneficiary. Cost rests in the product's form, in that physical or informational
elements are designed and built through the expenditure of material, energy, and time. Applying
this definition along the process stream, the distinct point is again that moment when the product
attains its complete physical existence. It is at this stage that the beneficiary can obtain the
product. The selling transaction solidifies the notion of benefit at cost. That is, the beneficiary
gains access to the product's intended function by making a payment in proportion to the
material, energy, and time expended by the seller. The stretch of the process stream prior to the
selling transaction consists of value creation activities conducted by the seller, and the stretch
following this point consists of value delivery activities realized by the beneficiary. Womack's
value stream refers to the value creation activities within the control of the business that sells the
product. His lean methodology focuses on the identification of value (benefit at cost) and waste
(cost at no benefit). Lean is most often associated with the elimination of waste. Using the
language above, waste denotes expended material, energy, and time for which the beneficiary
should not owe payment because no additional benefit is realized in return. However, waste
elimination represents a rather limited view of the lean methodology. To dispel this narrow
approach to implementing lean, Murmann et al. reiterate that "lean is a process of eliminating
waste with the goal of creating value" (Murmann 2002, 6).
Accordingly, the process stream should be analyzed with respect to what and how value is
created during each process. During the producing process (i.e. fabricating, assembling,
integrating from Figure 11), value rests in the physical form of the product as it is brought into
complete physical existence. Value creation occurs by changing (e.g. shaping, positioning)
material to yield the elements and structure specified by the product's form. The traditional
principles of lean production concentrate on how to develop and execute manufacturing
processes that minimize the material, energy, and time required to transform raw material into
finished product. During the developing process (i.e. conceiving, designing from Figure 11),
value rests in the informational form of the product as it is brought into complete mental
existence. Value creation occurs by generating sufficient information about the product such that
the detailed design and build-to package meets all requirements and specifications. This
information includes not only the product's concept, architecture, function, and form, but also
the test and evaluation results required to increase the certainty of meeting all requirements and
specifications. In this way, lean product development concentrates on how to develop and
execute design processes that minimize the energy and time required to yield a final design with
acceptable performance risk. Browning explains that in lean product development, "progress is
made and value is added by creating useful information that reduces uncertainty and/or
ambiguity... the purpose of these activities [such as measurement, analysis, review, and test] is
to increase certainty about the ability of the design to meet requirements. That is, these activities
decrease performance uncertainty and risk" (Browning 2002, 444). In summary, Figure 13
depicts the product life cycle with a notional "value bar" to identify the source of value along the
process stream.
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Figure 13: Process stream with consideration for process value
Though not captured in the sequential depiction of the process stream, the conceiving and
designing processes are inherently iterative, even when, for example, designing is expanded into
several subprocesses (e.g. preliminary and detailed designing). Iterative activities still create
value because discovering concepts and designs that do not meet requirements is as much a part
of decreasing performance risk as ultimately converging on a final design that does.
2.4. Integrated Product and Process Framework
To this point, the discussion has considered the relationship between product and process at a
rather basic level. 14 A complete framework should address how the process stream applies in the
context of complex product systems. Recall that product complexity can be thought about with
respect to form (e.g. number of elements and connections) and architecture (e.g. modular versus
integral function to form mapping). To some extent, these contributions to complexity grow in
opposition to each other. For example, an integral architecture (higher complexity) allocates
multiple functions to a single physical element, thus minimizing the number of parts. In contrast,
a modular architecture (lower complexity) may call for separate physical elements in order to
maintain one-to-one object-process relationships. Rather than quantifying the transition from
simple to complex, the author considers a complex product system to be any finished product
with an indisputably large number of elements and connections (e.g. hundreds or thousands) and
one or more subsystems with an integral architecture. Many classes of transportation systems, to
include automobiles, aircraft, and ships, fit this description. Each consists of thousands of parts
and contains integral subsystems, such as engines, electronics (avionics) boxes, and structural
frames. As will be discussed in the case study, satellites also satisfy these criteria.
In the context of complex product systems, the process stream can be viewed as a repeatedly
observed pattern of activity that is nested with respect to the decomposed product system. This
pattern is observed at the subsystem and component levels, just as it is at the system level. Each
physical or informational element, considered separately, must progress through all processes
along the flow. The process stream is nested because of the hierarchical nature of product
development and production. In his formulation of the axiomatic design methodology, Suh
suggests that design occurs between two domains - the functional and physical spaces (Suh
1990, 26). Using his terminology, functional requirements (FRs) reside in the functional domain
and establish what is to be achieved via a solution-neutral statement; design parameters (DPs)
reside in the physical domain and determine how it is to be achieved via a physical solution. The
design process entails decomposing system-level FRs and DPs into a sufficient level of detail to
yield a build-to package. A key principle of axiomatic design is zigzagging, which holds that an
14 Though referred to in the first section of this thesis, the term process architecture is not formally defined in this
framework. Architecture is reserved for systems of objects rather than sets of processes.
FR cannot be decomposed without first specifying the DP that satisfies it. That is, determining
what should be done at lower levels requires knowing how it will be done at higher levels. In
this way, there is a zigzagging between the functional and physical domains, which is depicted in
Figure 14, as the product's architecture and design are elaborated in sufficient detail.
Functional Domain Physical Domain
(OPD symbology not used)
precedes
Form
(OPD symbology used)
Figure 14: Zigzagging principle of axiomatic design methodology
An integrated product and process framework recognizes the nesting of the process stream as
the product system is decomposed into subsystems, components, and so on. Figure 15 shows the
complete framework envisioned from the above discussion. The two principal constituents are
(1) the product system (left side), represented using the decompositional view and (2) the process
stream (right side), abridged to include only the developmental processes. As shown, the process
stream repeats at each level in a nested fashion. At the upstream end, the lower level elements
cannot begin the conceiving process until the high level elements have been conceived (per the
zigzagging principle). At the downstream end, the higher level elements cannot begin the
integrating process until the lower level elements have been built.
:........_ i
Material
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Figure 15: Integrated product and process framework for complex product systems
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2.5. Enterprise Systems
For the most part, the above discussion has presented a product and process framework
without describing the people who are responsible for implementing it. There have been general
references made to suppliers, customers, process owners, and the business that sells the product,
but no formal treatment of their purpose, structure, and behavior. Here, a discussion of
enterprises introduces people into the framework. Rouse defines the term "enterprise" as a
"goal-oriented organization of resources - human, information, financial, and physical - and
activities, usually of significant operational scope, complication, risk, and duration" (Rouse
2005, 138). Though an enterprise encompasses more than the people who belong to it, human
resources are clearly its focal point and lifeblood. For the author's purposes, the discussion of
enterprises is limited to businesses organizations that sell products. Such organizations form
around a value proposition to address market needs with their products. Therefore, this
definition is adopted:
ENTERPRISE - an organization guided by a common purpose, namely, to
create one or more products with the intent of selling them for profit to
individuals or other organizations
Management scientists are increasingly choosing to study businesses and other organizations as
enterprise systems, just as engineers use a systems approach to study the products that these
organizations provide. Accordingly, an enterprise can be shown to exhibit all of the properties
that are inherent to any system.
2.5.1. Form, Function, and Architecture
An enterprise system can be described with respect to its form and function, where these
terms have meanings similar to when applied to product systems. Indeed, an organizational chart
is equivalent to the decompositional view of a product's form. In this case, the enterprise system
disaggregates into a hierarchy of elements (resource units), for example, divisions, subdivisions,
and so on. Organizational processes are analogous to the processes associated with a product's
function. Nightingale suggests three categories of processes exhibited by enterprises: (1) life
cycle processes, (2) enabling infrastructure processes, and (3) enterprise leadership processes
(Nightingale 2004, 5). The life cycle processes are the very same ones that compose the process
stream discussed above, where the operands are the product systems created by the enterprise.
The remaining two process categories include those activities required to support the life cycle
processes and self-sustain the enterprise as a whole. In effect, the operands here are various parts
of the enterprise itself. Figure 16 depicts the use of form and function to describe enterprises.
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Figure 16: Views of an enterprise's form and function
For the author's purposes, the focus lies on the life cycle processes, and so only these are
considered in this document. However, make no mistake that the entire set of organizational
processes is vital to the operation and sustainment of the enterprise system.
It follows that an enterprise also has an architecture associated with it - a mapping between
resource units (human, as well as information, financial, physical resources) and the processes
they enable. For an enterprise system, this definition is adopted:
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE - the allocation of organizational
processes to one or more elements of an enterprise, which, by virtue of its
organizational structure, enables the enterprise to create products and
realize its value proposition in a self-sustaining manner
Figure 17 summarizes the model of an enterprise system using the OPD construct seen before.
Figure 17: Model of an enterprise system
2.5.2. Product Management
The enterprise architecture assigns responsibility for each of the life cycle processes to at least
one element of the organization. The elements acquire or develop the resources required to carry
out their assigned processes, and the elements' leaders (e.g. division or subdivision managers)
are often designated as the process owners. In the most generic of architectures, the designing
process might be assigned to the design division, the building process to the build division, and
so on. In practice, the organization often separates into traditional functional disciplines, such as
the engineering division or production division. The framework presented here is not meant to
prescribe a particular nomenclature for organizational structures. Rather, the intent is to
illustrate, in general, the interconnections between the product and enterprise architectures. An
important functional group that does not explicitly follow from the process stream is the product
management function. Whereas other functional groups take responsibility for distinct processes
along the value stream, product management serves as a controlling function for the entire
product life cycle. While other functional groups are primarily concerned with the technical
performance, cost, and schedule contributions of their own processes, product management
oversees these parameters with respect to the entire product life cycle, to ensure that a reliable
solution progresses from concept to finished product within the overall budget and time
constraints. Figure 18 depicts a generic organizational structure overlaid on the product life
cycle. As shown, each functional group enables an individual process along the flow. For
example, the engineering division enables the designing process. The product management
function enables an overarching process, which is shown to affect the product at all stages. For
clarity, procedural links between processes and product states are omitted (see Figure 10).
Figure 18: Integration of product and enterprise architectures
2.6. Integrated Product Management Framework
At this point in the discussion, all of the key ideas and their definitions have been introduced.
The basic relationships between products, processes, and organizations have been described in
words and illustrated with OPDs. Still, a more complete framework handles the case of an
enterprise system that creates multiple complex product systems. Similar to the discussion in
subsection 2.4, where the process stream was used as a repeated pattern with respect to the
decomposed product system (see Figure 15), variations of the basic enterprise architecture from
Figure 18 can be repeated to extend the framework for complex product systems.
2.6.1. Common Enterprise Architectures
To start, it is useful to consider several types of enterprise architectures that are commonly
found in industry. Cusumano identifies four major types, which have been observed in the
automotive industry (and occur similarly elsewhere): (1) matrix organizations, (2) product team
organizations, (3) center organizations, and (4) semi-center organizations (Cusumano 1998, 53).
Figure 19 depicts the first three using an OPD and a diagram adapted from Cusumano (1998).
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Figure 19: Common enterprise architectures - matrix, product team, and center organizations
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In general, the primary difference between these architectures is if and how one or more
functional disciplines are duplicated within the organizational structure. The architecting
question at hand is whether functional groups should be multi-tasked with the development of all
products, or cross-functional teams should be dedicated to the development of individual
products. The key is striking a balance between deep functional expertise (inherent to single
disciplinary groups) and integrated product solutions (arising from multi-disciplinary teams).
Matrix and center organizations provide some degree of balance within their structures. In
practice, one of the two modes - either functional managers (i.e. process owners) or program
managers (i.e. product owners) - may tend to dominate the interaction.
2.6.2. Products Relative to the Enterprise
The enterprise architectures shown thus far have referred generally to the product in its
aggregated form. More precisely, complex product systems are disaggregated into subsystems
and components, and functional subgroups are assigned responsibility for life cycle processes in
the creation of these lower level products. As implied in Figure 15, subsystems and components
also progress through the process stream, and so it is expected that the enterprise architecture
supports their hierarchical development and production. With this in mind, it is useful to
distinguish hierarchical products relative to the enterprise. Here, two pairs of qualifiers are
suggested. First, end and intermediate denote whether a product is fully or partially aggregated
with respect to what the enterprise actually sells. Second, external and internal denote whether
or not a product crosses the boundary of an enterprise system. An end product is necessarily an
external product because it is fully aggregated and sold to a customer outside of the enterprise.
An internal product is necessarily an intermediate product because it is partially aggregated and
not sold to a customers outside of the enterprise (customers are internal, responsible for higher
level products). The only remaining case is an intermediate product that is also an external
product, which refers to a lower level product sourced to an outside supplier. The intermediate-
external products are related to the supply chain function (i.e. sourcing, procurement) within
enterprises. In part, this is a controlling function analogous to product management. It involves
overseeing and acquiring a product created outside of the enterprise, while considering its
technical performance, cost, and schedule. In a generic architecture, the supply chain managing
process might be assigned to the supply chain management division.
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Figure 20: Integration of complex product and enterprise architectures
Figure 20 depicts a matrix organizational structure overlaid on the product life cycle for a
complex product system. Note the disaggregation of functional groups into subgroups that are
responsible for creating products at the subsystem level. In this example, the enterprise sources
(to outside suppliers) all products below the subsystem level (e.g. components, subcomponents,
parts, material). As such, the supply chain management function is inserted. Though not shown,
in practice, the supply chain management division may disaggregate into sourcing teams for
various classes of sourced items.
2.6.3. Independent Tiers of Product Management
The architectural matter at the heart of the thesis problem statement can now be identified
with respect to the framework. Thus far, the product management function has been shown to
provide oversight for the end-external product. For complex product systems, this highest tier of
oversight is often referred to as program management - e.g. the Boeing 777 program or the
Lockheed Martin F-22 program. The program office (labeled as Product Team in Figure 19 and
Figure 20) serves as a direct liaison between the enterprise and its product's external customers -
e.g. commercial airlines or the United States Air Force. It is ultimately concerned with the
system-level performance and system development cost and time. In isolation, it seems logical
for the program office to disaggregate into subteams that oversee, in a similar manner, the
intermediate-internal products at the subsystem-level and below. However, for an enterprise that
creates multiple end-external products, there is an argument for having an independent lower tier
of product management that oversees intermediate-internal products, where this lower tier is not
hierarchically underneath one or more program offices. The rationale for this is discussed next.
Here, Figure 21 depicts how independent tiers of product management might occur within a
matrix organizational structure. As shown, the lower tier, Intermediate Product Team (Product
Office), is joined directly to the enterprise rather than through the higher tier, End Product Team
(Program Office). Not entirely obvious from the OPD, it is important to note that "1 ... m" tags
(i.e. participation constraint in OPD symbology) do not imply a one-to-one pairing of higher and
lower tier teams. On the contrary, the lower tier product teams are deliberately unmatched with a
particular program office, so that they might satisfy the requirements passed down from multiple
program offices in an optimized way.
Material
Figure 21: Independent tiers of product management - matrix organization
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2.6.4. Distinctiveness and Commonality
Independent tiers of product management are driven by how products' architectures compare
and contrast to each other. Some elements (subsystems, components, and so on) may only
satisfy requirements specific to a single end product, given the unique needs of a particular
external customer. Other elements may potentially satisfy requirements similar among multiple
end products, given the common needs of several external customers. A critical product
management task is identifying which elements fall into which category - distinct or common -
and then overseeing the product life cycle to ensure that elements are created in an optimal way.
One approach is to consider each element as distinct and then design and build it as such for a
single end product. However, there is an important tradeoff between distinctiveness and
commonality. Robertson explains, "customers care [that] a product closely meets their needs;
they are not particularly concerned about how many parts a collection of products has in
common... cost [for the enterprise] is largely driven by the level of parts held in common among
a collection of products and is not directly related to how distinctive those products are"
(Robertson 1998, 21). The author would suggest that customers are also concerned with
commonality to the extent that it drives cost and, in turn, price. Therefore, from the perspective
of both the enterprise and external customers, it would not be optimal to create a distinct element
for each of several end products, when they could reasonably be created as a single common
element for all end products.
How does either distinctiveness or commonality tend to arise with respect to the product
system hierarchy? As a general rule, distinctiveness is more critical for higher level products
because customers are more concerned with how system-level function and performance meet
their specific needs. In contrast, commonality can prevail for lower level products because many
subsystem-level functions are perceived by customers to be generic. Oftentimes, only a few
subsystems explicitly contribute to the ultimate distinctiveness of the end product. The
important consequence for enterprise architectures is that managing for distinctiveness differs
from managing for commonality. Since program offices are more inclined to manage their end
product for distinctiveness, it may be effective for an independent tier of product offices to
manage intermediate products for commonality. As a benchmark, consider how Toyota Motor
Corporation implements two tiers of product management within a center organizational
structure. Figure 22 depicts Toyota's product development organization using a diagram adapted
from Cusumano (1998) and the author's translation of this diagram into an OPD. 15 For clarity,
the OPD omits the lowest levels of the product system. At Toyota, each product center (3)
concentrates on a particular grouping of end products - e.g. one center each for rear-wheel drive
and front-wheel drive vehicles. Within each center, product teams (< 5) each own a particular
vehicle program, and functional groups (- 6) each own a development process carried out for all
vehicle programs in that center (effectively, a matrix organization within the center). At the
same time, a fourth product center owns the development of lower level products for all vehicle
programs in the first three centers. Toyota's rationale for this enterprise architecture involves the
tradeoff between distinctiveness and commonality. Whereas a program manager oversees the
entire vehicle and those subsystems distinctive to his/her vehicle (e.g. upper-body and interior
design), the fourth product center oversees those subsystems and components partially or
completely common to all vehicles (e.g. batteries, air conditioning units). In this way, the
respective product teams can use management criteria tailored for their product's role within the
architectures of one or more vehicles.
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15 This figure represents Toyota's product development organization, as of 1992 (Cusumano 1998, 30). Note that
Cusumano only considers Toyota's product development centers, without showing organizational connections
between these centers and production. Still, the production and test functional groups are included in the OPD.
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Toyota's product development organization illustrates how independent tiers of product
management might be implemented. More importantly, empirical data presented in Cusumano
(1998) show that better business performance can result, which Cusumano attributes to the way
center organizational structures more effectively manage the tradeoff between distinctiveness
and commonality. However, the Toyota example, at this level of detail, does not provide criteria
to determine under whose ownership - program office or product office - certain intermediate-
internal products should fall. Moreover, even when product ownership has been established,
there is still a question of how to balance the product development strategies of the two
independent tiers, which inherently conflict as program offices stress distinctiveness and product
offices stress commonality. To frame these issues, Figure 23 considers a spectrum for how
product owners could choose to manage their product's development. At one extreme (left), the
product owner chooses to treat each new product as completely distinct from all previous ones.
This is termed stovepiping to suggest that products are developed in isolation as one-offs. At the
other (right) extreme, the product owner chooses to make each new product identical to all
previous ones. This is termed cloning to suggest that products are developed as one-size-fits-all.
The spectrum represents how much a product owner chooses to trade between distinctiveness
and commonality. An in-between approach that seeks an appropriate balance is termed
platforming, where new products are developed with the objective to satisfy unique requirements
and leverage similarities with previous or concurrent products.
Stovepiping Platforming Cloning
100% Distinct ( > 100% Common
Start from scratch every time - Do it once and never change
One-off product development Increasing COMMONALITY Increasing DISTINCTIVENESS One-size-fits-all product development
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Figure 23: Spectrum of approaches to product management
Until product development begins, product owners cannot make a full determination of where
along this spectrum to operate. Indeed, the conceiving and designing processes are intended to
translate customer needs into functional requirements, using zigzagging to yield one or more
potential product architectures from which to choose. At this point, subsystems and components
can be identified as more or less suitable for stovepiping, cloning, or platforming. Rigorous
methodologies have been proposed for determining when platform development is appropriate.
For example, design structure matrices can identify groupings of functional requirements that
are decoupled from each other. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail
frameworks and techniques for platform development. The objective here is only to consider
how organizational structure influences the enterprise's ability to pursue a range of product
management approaches during the creation of complex product systems.
2.7. Section Summary
This section has presented a comprehensive framework to formalize the relationships between
products, processes, and organizations. A generic model for systems, which included the notions
of form, function, and architecture, was applied to products and enterprises. The process stream,
which is closely related to the product life cycle, was introduced to show the progression from
concept to finished product, with consideration for how product essence and process value
change along the flow. These basic constructs were integrated into a framework showing the
interconnections between product and enterprise architectures. Several common enterprise
architectures were described with the inclusion of controlling functions, such as product
management and supply chain management. The possibility of independent tiers of product
management was discussed with Toyota offered as a benchmark. Finally, the tradeoff between
distinctiveness and commonality among multiple products was explained and related to a
spectrum of product management approaches. In the next section, this framework is applied to
the NGST case study.
This page has been intentionally left blank.
3. Case Study for Complex System Management
This section presents a case study of Northrop Grumman Space Technology. As explained in
the first section, NGST has established revenue growth as a primary goal and is faced with
delivering competitive products as their existing and potential government customers stress
affordability and speed of development. A recent organizational restructuring strives to position
NGST to achieve this goal. The term product focus has been used to describe a general approach
to ensuring the competitiveness of their products. This idea has influenced the restructuring in
that certain functional groups have been reconfigured to promote greater accountability for all
levels of products. For example, newly defined management positions have been created to
oversee intermediate products. These types of modifications to the organizational structure are
within the scope of the framework discussion in the previous section. This case study provides a
rich example of how integrating the product and enterprise architectures - to achieve better
architectural "fit" - influences the ability of businesses to improve their performance. The
objectives of this section are as follows.
* Apply the presented framework within the developmental context of space systems and the
organizational context of NGST.
* Evaluate the architectural "fit" and realization of product focus at NGST through comparison
of their organizational structure before and after the realignment.
Following an order similar to that of the previous section, the initial two subsections of this
section describe space systems, in particular satellites, and their product life cycle. The third
subsection takes a detailed look at NGST's organizational structure before and after the
realignment. The fourth subsection analyzes the architectural "fit", concentrating on the
interaction between program offices and newly appointed product owners for intermediate-
internal products. The remaining subsections discuss the challenges that NGST faces moving
forward, as they strive to bring about the envisioned product focus.
3.1. Satellite Architecture
Space systems are among the most complex product systems ever developed by mankind.
Modern satellites often contain cutting edge technology and yet demand the highest standards for
reliability. Reliability is extremely critical because on-orbit servicing of satellite hardware is
rarely feasible. A paradoxical outcome is that hundreds of spin-off technologies have emerged
from space programs (e.g. Apollo, Space Shuttle) and yet satellites scheduled to launch in the
next several years will likely contain computing hardware from the 1990s, as a result of rigorous
space qualification standards. In addition to the high complexity of on-orbit elements, there is an
indispensable infrastructure that deploys and supports satellites. Launch vehicle development
and launch site operations constitute an entire subindustry of their own. Similarly, networks of
ground control stations and their space support operations are equally critical, initiating data
processing and dissemination and providing 24-7 satellite health monitoring. Accounting for the
entire system, this translates into life cycle costs in the millions or billions of dollars and
development periods of several years or more.
Figure 24 shows a decompositional view of a generic space system. The nomenclature for the
product hierarchy is mostly consistent with that used by NGST and others in the industry. As
noted above, the entire space system encompasses three so-called segments: (1) the on-orbit
(located in space) system, (2) the launch system, and (3) the ground control system.'16 In most
cases, especially major programs for government customers, a single business does not (and
cannot) completely provide all three segments. And so, in practice, a separate contract is often
awarded for each segment. NGST mainly competes for lead development contracts for the space
segment and less often seeks prime contracts for the ground segment (NGST chooses not to
concentrate on the launch segment). The space segment, considered synonymous with satellite,
is partitioned into two so-called elements: (1) the spacecraft bus and (2) the payload. 17
Depending on the program and its contract scheme, NGST may play any of the following roles:
(1) satellite prime integrator while providing both elements, (2) satellite prime integrator while
providing only the spacecraft bus, or (3) major subcontractor providing only the payload. Other
16 In some cases, the system of ground-based network/user terminals (e.g. for military satellite communications)
may be considered as a fourth segment.
17 Element, as used in the space system hierarchy, should not be confused with its usage above as an object of the
product's form.
arrangements may occur, depending on how teams of businesses choose to bid for government
contracts. Further decomposition of the spacecraft bus is discussed next, but consider the lower
levels of the product hierarchy shown in Figure 24. Satellite subsystems, for either the
spacecraft bus or payload, are more often than not a combination of mechanical and electrical
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Figure 24: Decompositional views of a space system
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components. As shown, a different nomenclature pertains to each class of component, though
some components may not strictly fall within one category. For the remainder of this case study,
the system boundary is drawn around the satellite (space segment). Furthermore, NGST's end-
external products are limited to either the spacecraft bus or the payload, and it is assumed they
always perform system-level integration when providing the spacecraft bus (i.e. a satellite with
NGST's spacecraft bus and a subcontractor's payload).
The reason for partitioning the satellite into the spacecraft bus and payload relates to the
overall product architecture. Generally speaking, the payload encompasses the elements whose
allocated functions accomplish the satellite's mission, directly providing value to beneficiaries.
The operand of a payload function is external to the satellite, for example, communication
signals from earth or X-rays from outer space. In Larson's words, the payload "consists of the
hardware and software that sense or interact with the [external] subject" (Larson 1999, 12). The
spacecraft bus, or simply the spacecraft, encompasses the remaining elements that exist solely to
support the payload and self-sustain the satellite as a whole. Figure 25 shows a decompositional
view of the spacecraft bus. 18 There are seven major spacecraft subsystems found in nearly all
satellites.
Figure 25: Decompositional view of a spacecraft bus
18 Some spacecraft subsystems are defined in different ways, referred to by various names, and have overlapping
purposes. For example, the communication subsystem may also be called the telemetry, tracking, and command
subsystem; the attitude control subsystem and guidance and navigation subsystem both deal with a satellite's
position and orientation. Those shown in the figure are ones most commonly cited and capture the majority of
spacecraft functions. Note also thatflight software is not listed separately.
Since payloads are inherently mission-specific, there is no standard set of payload subsystems,
but most can be classified broadly as (1) passive sensors intended to detect a given part of the
electromagnetic spectrum (e.g. infrared, X-ray, gamma ray) or (2) communication systems
intended to receive and transmit user data, serving as a relay in a network of ground terminals
and other satellites. In the latter case, an all-encompassing communication system provides the
data reception and transmission functions required by both the payload and spacecraft
communication subsystem.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe in greater detail the form and function of
individual spacecraft subsystems. For the author's purposes, a basic understanding of the overall
satellite architecture is sufficient. Figure 26 presents the generic architecture of a satellite,
showing the high-level processes associated with each spacecraft subsystem. Despite the
apparent simplicity of this OPD, modem satellites are characterized by a highly integral
architecture and complex structural form with thousands of elements in a tight spatial
configuration. This is driven by strict considerations for size, weight, and power (SWaP). Since
launch cost scales directly with satellite mass and launch vehicles have maximum capacities in
terms of mass and volume, minimizing weight and power is a prevailing design objective. Each
kilogram eliminated from the spacecraft bus translates into lower launch cost or a greater
allocation of mass to the payload.
3.2. Satellite Life Cycle
In general, the product life cycle for satellites contains the same set of processes observed for
all product systems. Some additional processes - system engineering processes and technology
development processes - are introduced here, given their particular importance for NGST.
Figure 27 depicts process streams for a satellite and spacecraft subsystem. Two process flows
are shown in parallel (though not explicitly connected) in order to highlight slight variations in
terminology. In the top flow, the satellite progresses from concept to flight ready system during
the developmental processes, and then becomes an operational, on-orbit satellite upon successful
launch. System engineering is depicted as an end-to-end process that affects the satellite in an
unspecified way. At the system-level, system engineering processes focus on the overall mission
and high-level function and performance of the satellite. In the bottom flow, the spacecraft
subsystem progresses from concept to finished subsystem, ready for integration and test (I&T)
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Figure 26: Generic satellite architecture
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at the system level. Again, system engineering is as an end-to-end process that affects the
subsystem, focusing here only on the requirements and functions allocated to the particular
subsystem. Technology development is shown as a separate process outside of the main flow.
This captures the reality that basic/applied research does not typically mesh with the sequential
flow of product development. That is, new technologies are identified and matured on an often
unpredictable schedule. Consequently, technology in itself is considered to enable conceiving
and designing of spacecraft subsystems, and not be consumed by these processes.
There are two notes on terminology, which are illustrated in Figure 27. First, the building
process is typically referred to using different terms at the satellite (or spacecraft) and subsystem
levels. As shown, spacecraft subsystems are fabricated and assembled on their own, and the
satellite is integrated as a whole. Second, the testing process has slightly different purposes for
the satellite and subsystem levels. Verification refers to objectively proving that a subsystem or
lower level product complies with requirements and specifications.19 Verification methods are
often classified into four types: (1) inspection, (2) demonstration, (3) analysis, and (4) test.
Validation refers to providing evidence that a system will meet its mission objectives under
expected operating conditions at some confidence level. Consequently, as shown, spacecraft
subsystems are verified during testing and the satellite is validated.
3.3. Organizational Structure
As noted above, NGST competes as a prime integrator of satellites and furthermore,
maintains the in-house capabilities for end-to-end development of both the spacecraft bus and
payload. Consequently, NGST's enterprise architecture encompasses the full scope of functional
groups required to design and build spacecraft and payload subsystems, as well as carry out
system-level integration and test of the satellite. Critical to the satellite integrator's role, system
engineering is a formal end-to-end process that warrants its own functional subgroup.
Technology development processes are also especially important to NGST, who, as described in
the first section, has a reputation for pushing the state-of-the art of subsystem functionality and
performance.
19 The system engineering discipline often distinguishes between a requirement and a specification, where the rather
subtle difference relates to how they are stated in words and the nature of the test that provides verification or
validation. Here, the two terms are used interchangeably.
This subsection discusses NGST's enterprise architecture in both its pre- and post-
realignment configurations. The figures presented here do not represent the exact organizational
charts for NGST. Only the functional groups responsible for relevant life cycle processes are
considered (i.e. functional groups such as human resources and information technology are
omitted). Even for these, not all subgroups and sub-subgroups are shown, and the names given
for groups and subgroups may or may not match the formal titles used by NGST. This is in the
interest of clarity and is not meant to oversimplify their organization. The author has made every
attempt not to misrepresent the actual or intended design of NGST's organizational structure.
3.3.1. Pre-Realignment Architecture
Prior to the realignment, the governing concept for the NGST enterprise architecture was
process focus. As mentioned, functional groups were assigned explicit ownership of processes,
which were grouped into core and enabling process areas. Formal process ownership was
meant to ensure that all processes were clearly defined, documented, measured, and managed for
compliance and improvement. Figure 28 depicts NGST's pre-realignment organizational
structure with the hierarchical nomenclature on the left. As shown, there are six (core) process
areas. In practice, NGST operated as a matrix organization (similar to that shown in Figure 19),
where program offices are equivalent to product teams and major functional groups (e.g.
Engineering, Production & Supply Chain, and Payload & Sensors) simultaneously provided
resources to support each program office. For the most part, Business Development operated
Figure 28: Organizational structure - pre-realignment
independently to identify market opportunities and develop bids and proposals for government
contracts. A formal program office was established under Programs upon contract award and
authorization to proceed. Similarly, Technology Development mostly operated on its own to run
independent and cooperative research and development projects, transitioning new technology to
Engineering and Production & Supply Chain when appropriate. Looking at the directorate level,
there are several items to note. First, both the design engineering and production processes are
partitioned into subgroups for electrical and mechanical spacecraft components. Second, the
system engineering process, though end-to-end in nature, is housed in Engineering where the
front-end mission and requirements analysis occurs. Third, processes related to the supply chain
management function - sourcing commodity parts and material, managing smaller subcontracts
for components or below, managing larger subcontracts for payload subsystems - are dispersed
among multiple process areas.
Using the complete framework from the second section, Figure 29 illustrates NGST's pre-
realignment enterprise architecture with respect to the satellite and spacecraft subsystem process
streams given above. This version assumes that NGST is the satellite prime integrator while
providing the spacecraft bus and subcontracting the payload. For clarity, only the six process
areas (rather than the directorates) are used in the OPD. Overall, the enterprise architecture
reflects the traditional matrix organizational structure with a single tier of product management
(for end-external products) provided by the program office. Separation of functional groups is
maintained at both the satellite and spacecraft subsystem levels (note that redundant instances are
shown for Engineering and Production & Supply Chain in order to keep the OPD uncluttered).
As noted above, there are multiple functional groups that manage intermediate-external products.
For example, Payloads & Sensors is dedicated to managing subcontracts for payload subsystems.
Note that management of subcontracts for spacecraft components, which is owned by
Engineering, is not explicitly shown.
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Figure 29: Integrated product and enterprise architectures - pre-realignment
3.3.2. Post-Realignment Architecture
The governing concepts under the realignment are that the NGST enterprise architecture
embodies customer focus and product focus. As stated before, this does not represent a loss of
process focus, but rather a change in emphasis made explicit through reorganization. Figure 30
depicts NGST's post-realignment organizational structure with the hierarchical nomenclature on
the left. In order to better meet the needs of all government customers, the former Programs
process area is divided into three Program Centers (at the division-level) - each for a different
market segment (e.g. civil, military). Each Program Center groups the program offices for their
respective market segment. Similarly, the former Business Development process area is divided
into three subgroups and made internal to each Program Centers. The former Technology
Development process area is also treated as a center for research and development projects, as
well as some technology demonstration programs. This portion of the realignment is clearly
intended to address customer needs and market opportunities in a more systematic way.
Figure 30: Organizational structure - post-realignment
In order to improve the end-to-end development of satellites, three divisions are formed by
reconfiguring pieces of the former Engineering, Production & Supply Chain, and Payloads &
Sensors process areas. First, the Engineering & Production division combines the design
engineering and production subgroups for products at the subsystem-level and below (both
electrical and mechanical components). Second, the System Engineering, Integration & Test
(SEIT) division marries the formal system engineering subgroup with the integration and test
subgroup. In sum, this represents the front-end mission and requirements analysis and the back-
end system-level validation. Third, the Supply Chain division consolidates management of all
subcontracts (both spacecraft and payload subsystems) and sourcing of commodity parts and
material. Note also the subgroups labeled Product Offices under the Engineering & Production
and SEIT divisions. These are brand new directorate-level units that represent a second tier of
product management responsible for lower-level products. The significance of these product
owners are discussed in detail in the next subsection. Overall, this portion of the realignment is
clearly intended to refocus the enterprise on delivering competitive products at all levels.
Under the realignment, NGST's three customer divisions and three product divisions still
operate as a matrix organization, where the latter provides resources to support the former. More
precisely, it might be said that NGST has close to a semi-center organization because some
functional disciplines are duplicated to serve individual program centers (e.g. business
development) and others are not (e.g. engineering, production). Figure 31 illustrates NGST's
post-realignment enterprise architecture with respect to the relevant process streams. Again, this
version assumes that NGST is the satellite prime integrator while providing the spacecraft bus
and subcontracting the payload. For clarity, only divisions are used in the OPD. At first glance,
the "tiered" nature of this enterprise architecture stands out. For example, the Engineering &
Production division carries out end-to-end product development of spacecraft subsystems and the
SEIT division effectively does the same at the satellite level. Note that two instances of system
engineering processes are shown and enabled by two different divisions. This is meant to draw a
distinction between the system-level activities (owned by SEIT) that are most critical for the
satellite integrator and the subsystem-level activities (owned by Engineering & Production) that
are inherent in the architecting and detailed design of all products. Overall, this enterprise
architecture clearly positions NGST to achieve a greater product focus because accountability for
each of the three classes of products rests with a single division. That is, the Supply Chain
division owns all intermediate-external products (from material to payload), the Engineering &
Production division owns the process stream for all intermediate-internal products, and the SEIT
division owns the process stream for all end-external products. The key question is how
independent tiers of product management - Program Offices and Product Offices - will coexist
to balance the development of intermediate-internal products and end-external products.
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Figure 31: Integrated product and enterprise architectures - post-realignment
3.4. Evaluation of Architectural Fit
As suggested at the outset of this thesis, architectural "fit" is not something that can be
measured directly, but rather correlates with the value provided to customers. This subsection
evaluates NGST's realignment by examining how their new organizational structure positions
them to enhance the value of their products. In general, customer value increases as the product
provides a better technical solution to customer needs, costs less, and takes less time to develop.
Overall, the NGST realignment has the potential to increase customer value with respect to all of
these. Since affordability and speed of development are key differentiators, the focus of this
discussion will be on how their organizational structure enables reductions in development cost
and time. It should be noted that a large majority of satellite development programs, especially
the most technologically advanced systems that NGST often provides, are awarded through cost-
plus contracts with the government. 20 As such, cost and time are effectively one in the same
because government compensation is equal to the contractor's expenses, to include all labor
hours. And, in fact, direct labor (and related indirect charges) typically constitutes the largest
proportion of program costs. Therefore, reducing development time (i.e. cumulative man-hours)
necessarily reduces cost. Here, the potential for increased customer value is identified in two
places within the integrated product and process framework.
3.4.1. Intra-Stream Value
The term intra-stream value refers to how well products at the same level (e.g. system,
subsystem) progress along their own process stream. In the case of NGST's products, the
process streams for the satellite (or spacecraft) and spacecraft subsystems can each be isolated
and assessed for their cost and time efficiency. Prior to NGST's realignment, design and
production were separated into distinct functional divisions. This created the oft-observed rift
between engineers and manufacturers, where a design might be "thrown over the wall" to
production. Because the Engineering and Production & Supply Chain process areas were
division-level units, this separation was present at all product levels. Even as the process focus
took root throughout NGST, inter-division coordination was not always optimal. Despite the
matrix organization, which created cross-functional teams to serve each program office, there
20 Government contracts are categorized broadly as either fixed-price or cost-plus. The contractor bears most of the
development risk under fixed-price contracts. The government bears most of this risk under cost-plus contracts.
Cost-plus contracts typically include an incentive or award fee paid to the contractor based on their performances.
was still a tendency for functional stovepipes, or so-called "cylinders of excellence," to exist.
Process areas strived to control and improve the life cycle processes that they owned, but this
action in itself did not necessarily guarantee efficient coordination among adjacent process areas.
Consequently, the handoff between design and production was not always smooth, resulting in
various forms of inter-division rework. For example, engineering orders (EOs), which amend
build-to drawings (e.g. type and quantity of parts, assembly instructions) and are passed from
design to production, could range from typographical errors to substantial redesign. If designs
were found to pose problems for production, or engineering found reason to change an already
delivered design, this created delays and disruptions in the form of EOs. To be fair, many EOs
propagate from changing requirements and specifications on the part of external customers.
However, separate functional divisions for design and production built into the organizational
structure a higher likelihood for this critical handoff in the process stream to be a source of delay.
The realignment positions NGST to improve coordination along the process streams for their
products. At the subsystem level (spacecraft bus and payload), design and production are now
combined within a single division. Furthermore, the Engineering & Production division contains
two directorates (see Figure 30), each responsible for design and production of either electrical
or mechanical subsystems. This configuration has the potential to significantly improve the
handoff between functional disciplines. Most notably, there are greater opportunities to
implement design for manufacture and assembly (DFMA) guidelines, which should reduce EOs
and other forms of design rework discovered during production. This was not completely absent
within prior cross-functional product teams, but now the functional reporting chain is much
shorter (i.e. a single director owns both design engineering and production processes), which
should enable better coordination. Overall, the Engineering & Production division has tighter
end-to-end ownership of subsystem-level processes, which has the potential to reduce
development time and cost.
At the system level, coordination is similarly improved between system engineering and I&T.
Though not explicitly shown in Figure 30, an important functional subgroup associated with I&T
is one responsible for the development of ground test equipment, often referred to as test sets.
While some tests are common to all satellites (e.g. shock and vibrational testing, thermal vacuum
testing), many are specific to the spacecraft and payload and are designed to test operational
command sequences particular to the mission. For example, test sets contain customized
hardware and software that simulate or emulate signals expected in the on-orbit operational
environment. Since system engineering conducts the mission-level requirements analysis,
articulates system-level specifications, and constructs the matrix of verification/validation
methods, coordination with test set development and I&T is critical. Here again, these functional
disciplines are now combined into a single division. The SEIT division has the potential to
significantly improve the handoff between system engineering and I&T. Similar to DFMA
between engineering and production, design for testability should reduce any rework in the
development of test sets and avoid delays during the validation testing of the satellite. Overall,
the SEIT division has end-to-end ownership of system-level processes, which should again
position NGST to reduce development time and cost.
3.4.2. Inter-Stream Value
The term inter-stream value refers to how well products at different levels are managed in
parallel and integrated upward in the product hierarchy (see the nested pattern of process streams
in Figure 15). Prior to NGST's realignment, the product management function existed primarily
within the bounds of a program office. For example, the Program Office managed the satellite as
a whole, and a group of integrated product teams (IPTs) were assigned product ownership of the
program's spacecraft and payload subsystems, including so-called configured items of critical
importance to the system. In practice, this product management structure formed program
stovepipes. Given the tendency of Program Offices and their IPTs to manage most levels of
products for distinctiveness, a stovepiping approach (see Figure 23) treated both the end-external
product and its intermediate-internal products as one-off designs. This is not to say engineers
started with blank sheet designs (clearly, cumulative learning and tacit knowledge improved the
design cycle from program to program). But design reuse and other forms of commonality were
less prevalent because product ownership rested within the bounds of the Program Office. The
outcome with respect to customer value was highly customized product solutions that incurred
full development cost and time. For some subsystems and configured items, this was necessary,
given unique mission requirements. For others, what tended not to be fully explored was how to
leverage previous or concurrent designs to shorten the development cycle and boost the
production volume of some components.
Another consequence of this product management structure was difficulty in identifying the
average cost and cycle time of intermediate-internal products. Because ownership of lower level
products did not cross-cut the program offices, there was limited accountability for their end-to-
end to development from a program-neutral perspective. Cost and schedule management was
tailored for each program and documented as such at all product levels. The outcome was that
subsequent programs found it difficult to benchmark previous and concurrent ones. For
example, the Business Development process area had to reconcile different cost accounting
structures among programs (e.g. how to allocate labor and material costs to subsystems or so-
called box-level products), in order to generate bottom-up bids on new contracts. Overall,
NGST's tendency towards program stovepipes impeded greater accountability for lower level
products and deterred a platforming approach for many spacecraft subsystems and components.
The realignment positions NGST to break down these program stovepipes by implementing
independent tiers of product management. As noted, a key feature of the new organizational
structure is the Product Office (at the directorate-level) within the Engineering & Production
division. Though the exact nature of its responsibilities is still being determined, the general idea
is to introduce a product management function for intermediate-internal products that is
completely independent from Program Offices. Figure 32 depicts the two-tiered product
ownership structure envisioned by the realignment. This figure provides greater detail at the
subsystem-level than Figure 31 (and omits the supply chain and technology development
functions to avoid a cluttered OPD). Note the distinction between process ownership, assigned
to Design Engineering & Production directorates, and product ownership, assigned to the
Product Offices. The former takes a program-neutral view of process control; the latter takes a
program-neutral view of product management. A tandem of process and product owners also
exists at the system-level, where the directorates within the SEIT division control the satellite
process stream and the Program Offices manage the end-external products.
At a minimum, the Product Office provides greater accountability for intermediate-internal
products and a formal oversight mechanism for managing their technical performance, cost, and
schedule. The Product Office is effectively a supplier of finished products to a set of internal
customers - the Program Offices. Just as NGST's government customer contract for a satellite
within prescribed budget and time constraints, the Program Offices can internally "subcontract"
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Figure 32: Independent tiers of product management - post-realignment
the Product Office for spacecraft and payload subsystems in the same way. This two-tiered
model for product creation is now built into NGST's new organizational structure.
More importantly, the Product Office has the potential to significantly increase customer
value by developing "product lines" of spacecraft subsystems and components. For these lower
level products, there is an opportunity to introduce greater commonality across programs,
moving from a stovepiping to a platforming approach, wherever possible. Commonality drives
reductions in development cost and time in two main ways: (1) minimizing the time to complete
upstream development processes, generally referred to as non-recurring engineering (NRE) and
(2) generating economies of scale in downstream production processes.
At NGST, NRE is often pointed to as a primary target for cost reduction. Eliminating design
rework, discussed above as part of intra-stream value, is one means to decrease NRE. However,
commonality provides a more sweeping method to reduce NRE. In theory, NRE should
approach zero as product managers approach the cloning end of the spectrum (see Figure 23).
Though 100% design reuse of spacecraft subsystems is unlikely, platforming has the potential to
share subsystem NRE across concurrent programs and evolve a family of similar designs for use
in follow-on programs. Program stovepipes have typically prevented systematic sharing of NRE,
though at least one government contract for a pair of satellites successfully pursued a common
spacecraft bus. While a so-called common bus may or may not be feasible over NGST's full
range of market segments, the Product Office can determine which spacecraft subsystems and
components have widely common designs, and develop product lines accordingly.
The other consequence of commonality is increased repetition of recurring processes for a
given product, such as fabrication, assembly, and test. This translates into cost reduction through
economies of scale and learning effects from cumulative output. Though satellite production is
inherently a low-volume, high-mix industry, some appreciable scale might be reached at the
subsystem and component levels. Product line development can be an effective means to
realizing this scale, especially now that the Product Offices can work in conjunction with the
Design Engineering & Production directorates to evolve product lines and manufacturing
processes in a coordinated manner. Overall, the implementation of independent tiers of product
management has the potential to greatly reduce development cost and time across all programs.
3.5. Challenges Following Realignment
The above discussion suggests that the realignment has, in fact, positioned NGST to realize
the product focus envisioned by their executive management team. Formal ownership of
intermediate-internal products in the form of Product Offices provides both features identified in
the first section of this thesis - (1) mechanisms to ensure accountability and (2) methods to
manage product evolution. Still, a new organizational structure in itself does not guarantee better
business performance. This subsection outlines several challenges that NGST faces as they look
to realize the expected advantages of this new structure.
NGST has implemented numerous reorganizations throughout its history in the satellite
industry and each one has brought with it general challenges inherent to any organizational
change, as well as some particular to the immediate change. Described here are those challenges
that might be encountered as part of the latest realignment.
Program-centric execution. For the most part, programs have always been "king" on the Space
Park campus, which comes as no surprise because program offices take their lead directly from
their external customers. As government customers for cost-plus contracts have come to expect
build-to-order, customized products from NGST, program offices have learned to develop them
within the traditional matrix organization. As discussed, the outcome has been a tendency to
form program stovepipes, where IPT members narrowly focus on the objectives of their assigned
program. The two-tiered product management structure has the potential to weaken customized
development of lower level products in return for the benefits of greater commonality. Will a
Product Office's development decision take priority over that of a Program Office, if the global
optimum for all programs requires one Program Office to suboptimize? In order for the Product
Office to be truly effective, Program Offices (and their external customers) must be willing to
negotiate or compromise under certain circumstances.
Engineering culture. NGST's organizational culture has long been dominated by engineers,
who take great pride in the innovativeness and technological superiority that characterize the
satellites they design. Given this, maximizing design reuse and other forms of commonality may
not be an attractive objective for many engineers. It would not be out of the question for an
engineer to pass on an opportunity to reuse an existing component design in favor of a chance to
redesign it from scratch in order to optimize performance. Functional managers must ensure that
engineers comply with design reuse processes and still provide them with opportunities to tackle
technically challenging problems.
Pace of technological change. Rapid changes in technology pose a significant challenge to
developing and maintaining product lines of spacecraft subsystems and components. Due to the
long development cycle for satellites, there are a limited number of programs underway at any
point in time. Consecutive generations of the "same" satellite (i.e. mission capability) can be
separated by more than five years. Meanwhile, core technologies are continuously improving or
being disrupted by more advanced ones. In order for NGST to sustain product lines, the Product
Offices must be engaged to some extent with the technology development processes to ensure
continuity between current and follow-on programs. Otherwise, a product line arising from a
group of concurrent programs may be obsolete without a development path for inserting next-
generation technology.
Cost accounting regulations. Even if NGST's external customers support a platforming
approach to developing spacecraft subsystems and components, there are certain practical
matters to overcome. For one, federal regulations prescribe strict cost accounting procedures for
government contracts. All labor hours, material purchases, indirect charges, and so on are
carefully billed to job numbers associated with particular contracts. Because federal funding is
allocated for specific tasks within a contract's statement of work, it is difficult to pool funding
from multiple programs in support of product line development. In fact, engineers engaged in
design work for separate programs are prohibited from meeting together and then charging labor
hours to separate contracts. In order to share NRE, NGST must cooperate across government
customers to identify arrangements that fall within the cost accounting regulations.
Security requirements. Due to the sensitive nature of some satellite programs, in particular
those for military customers, security requirements also present a challenge for product line
development. Some technologies, which might otherwise be incorporated into a common
platform of subsystems or components, may not be transferable to programs without the same
security restrictions. In this way, product lines might be confined to certain market segments or
to programs contracted for a subset of government customers.
3.6. Section Summary
This section has presented a case study of Northrop Grumman Space Technology, focusing
on their recent organizational realignment. A primary objective has been to use the framework
proposed in the previous section to evaluate how NGST's new organizational structure positions
them ensure the competitiveness of their products. The product architecture for space systems
was described, with particular attention given to the decomposition of the spacecraft bus. The
process streams for satellites and spacecraft subsystems were elaborated. System engineering
and technology development processes were introduced, which are critical to NGST's role as a
system integrator and technology leader. The organizational structure and enterprise architecture
of NGST were discussed in both their pre- and post-realignment configurations. A key feature of
the new organizational structure was how accountability for each class of product is now rests
with a single division. The architectural "fit" was evaluated by identifying opportunities for
reducing development cost and time. Within the process stream, combining design and
production and combining system engineering and I&T are potential sources of value due to
better coordination. Between process streams, the two-tiered product management structure
provides the opportunity to pursue greater commonality at the subsystem and component levels.
Finally, several challenges to realizing the benefits of the new organizational structure were
described. The next and final section summarizes and reiterates the key insights gained from this
research effort and suggests future areas of study.
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4. Conclusion
It is worth repeating the insight offered at the opening of this document: "The architectures
of the product, its construction process, and the organization that manages them should "fit" each
other" (Rechtin 2000, 159). This thesis strives to provide some formality to this heuristic by
systematically describing products, processes, and organizations, and modeling interconnections
among all three. In doing so, a primary objective has been to identify features of the enterprise
architecture that improve customer value by addressing the full scope of their needs - technical
performance and reliability, affordability, and timely product delivery. It appears that the critical
construct within the enterprise architecture is a tandem of formal process owners and product
owners. While a process owner takes responsibility for the design and control of one or more
life cycle processes within the value stream, a product owner takes responsibility for the end-to-
end development of products across the entire value stream. This is relatively straightforward
when the enterprise creates simple products. A traditional matrix organization of functional
groups and product teams can be quite effective under these circumstances.
However, in the context of complex product systems, the development effort expands into a
hierarchy of intermediate subsystems and components that compose the end system. These
subsystems and components constitute products in themselves and can be assigned a product
owner in the same way as their parent system. Process owners can also be designated to control
a parallel value stream for these lower level products. This two-tiered structure of product
owners and process owners enables the enterprise to develop each level of products according to
different criteria. Distinctiveness and commonality may be balanced differently at each level.
This thesis has provided examples of how the enterprise architecture can adapt to "fit" such
complex product systems. Toyota's center organization for product development has been a
benchmark in the automotive industry. This thesis has presented a case study of NGST to
illustrate a similar approach in the satellite industry.
4.1. Research Outcomes
As mentioned earlier, the announcement and implementation of NGST's realignment
occurred during the course of the author's internship. While many changes to the organizational
structure were reconfigurations of existing functional groups and subgroups (e.g. combining
design engineering and production, combining system engineering and I&T), the Product Offices
represented formations of brand new directorates. The author had the opportunity to engage the
newly appointed directors of these Product Offices, who were faced with defining their roles and
responsibilities essentially from a blank sheet - a so-called "white space" job. A major topic for
discussion was the selection of intermediate-internal products to serve as pilot products as the
Product Office started to develop its processes. It was clear that certain spacecraft subsystems
were more amenable to platforming, given their technical nature and lower susceptibility to some
of the implementation challenges previously described. Another important topic was interaction
between the Product Offices and Program Offices. The author used his framework to illustrate
conceptually how independent tiers of product management can manage each level of products
with different development criteria. Still, an overarching consideration is establishing criteria
that govern the interface between the Product Offices and Program Offices. For example, under
what circumstances does the Program Office have the priority to insist upon a customized design
that deviates from a planned product line? Or does the Product Office's platform planning have
to regularly yield to the specific needs of each Program Office?
It will likely require several test cases to determine the answers to these and related questions.
Unfortunately, the author was not in a position to observe or participate in an example test case
over the course of his internship. Given the inherently long development cycle for satellites, the
role of the Product Office may take a few years to mature. In the short-term, the Product Offices
can certainly provide greater accountability for intermediate-internal products, which is a vital
first step. The longer-term measure of effectiveness is the extent to which they can drive
commonality into subsystems and components that are utilized in multiple satellite programs.
4.2. Future Research Opportunities
A logical extension to this thesis and important area for future research is to expand the
definition of an enterprise when considering architectural "fit." The first step is to include the
other two categories of organizational processes in the enterprise architecture and investigate
how they relate to product architecture and contribute to value delivered to customers and other
stakeholders. Recall that this thesis only considered the life cycle processes and not the enabling
infrastructure and enterprise leadership processes. To be clear, NGST's realignment did not
leave their former enabling process areas (e.g. human resources) unchanged.
A second step is to take a further expanded view that includes key customers, suppliers, and
partners. The so-called extended enterprise considers the complete collection of cooperating
organizations that constitutes an enterprise supersystem. In this thesis, boundaries were drawn
around a central firm, creating external interfaces with suppliers and customers through which
supply chain managers and program mangers acted. The extended enterprise internalizes these
interactions with suppliers and customers and more closely considers the processes that exchange
information, financial, and physical resources between them and the central firm. This approach
is highly applicable in the context of the satellite industry and the greater aerospace industry. As
mentioned, several government contracts are typically awarded in the development of a complete
space system. Teams of contractors bid for a particular segment, and the roles of prime
integrator and major subcontractor are established within each team. It is quite often the case
that a partner for one proposal may be a competitor for another one. Clearly, the question of
architectural "fit" is relevant to the contractor team as a whole, which represents an extended
enterprise of cooperating organizations. For NGST, the extended enterprise might be either the
contractor team for a particular satellite program or the greater Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Overall, the ideas presented in this thesis are a small piece of the growing field of enterprise
architecting and the greater discipline of engineering systems. Future research should continue
to formalize the relationships between products, processes, and organizations by extending the
boundary of the enterprise system.
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Appendix A
This appendix provides a short introduction to the Object-Process Methodology (OPM) that is
presented in Dori (2002). OPM provides a set of practices, procedures, and rules to "express the
function, structure, and behavior of systems in an integrated, single model" (Dori 2002, 4). It
includes two modes: (1) graphical descriptions of systems called Object-Process Diagrams and
(2) natural language sentence descriptions of systems called Object-Process Language (the latter
has not been used in this document). The goal of OPM is to establish a common, rigorous
modeling framework for understanding and developing systems of all kinds.
The three tables that follow name and describe the items and their symbols that are used to
construct OPDs: (1) entities are the building blocks, (2) structural links show relationships
between objects, and (3) procedural links show relationships between objects/states and
processes. 21 This is not an exhaustive list of OPD items, but rather provides a legend for those
items that appear in the figures of this document. For a comprehensive catalog and explanation
of the OPD symbology, please refer to Dori's Object-Process Methodology.
Entities
Name Symbol Definition Description
An object is a thing Static things. Can be
that has the potential of changed only by
Object Object stable, unconditional processes.
physical or mental
existence.
A process is a pattern Dynamic things. Are
Process Process(ing) of transformation that recognizable by theProcess Process(ing)
an object undergoes. changes they cause to
objects.
A state is a situation an States describe objects.
Object object can be at. They are attributes of
State objects. Processes can
change an object's
state.
21 These three tables are adapted from the quick-reference tables that are printed at the front and rear of the
hardcover edition of Dori (2002).
Structural Links
Name Symbol / Usage Meaning Description
refers to Relation from
source object to
A connection destination
Tagged
Source refers to Destination or an object; relation
Object Object association is recorded
between along link.
things that
holds Relation from
irrespective source object to
(Null) of time. destinationSource Destination
Object Object object with no
tag.
Aggregation A
Exhibition
Generalization A
Relates a B and C are
whole to its parts of the
parts whole A.
I I I
Relates an B and C are
exhibitor to attributes of A.
its attributes
SI. I f f
Relates a B and C are
general thing types of A.
to its
specialization
SI _ I _I _I
Procedural Links
Name Symbol / Usage Description
Transforming Links
Process uses object up
entirely during its
Consumption Object occurrence.
Process creates an entirely
new object during its
Result occurrence.
Processing Object
Process changes the state of
the object in an unspecified
Effect manner.
Processing Object
The object is at input state
prior to the process
Object occurrence, and at output
state as a result of its
Innut / Outnut input state output state occurrence.
--- r -- -- -
Enabling Links
Object is a human that is not
changed by the process;
Agent process needs the agent
Object Processing object in order to occur.
Object is a non-human that is
not changed by the process;
Instrument process needs the instrument
Object Processing object in order to occur.
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